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F ree and open source software (FOSS), which is by now entrenched in the tech-nology sector, has recently traveled far beyond this sphere in the form of arti-
facts, licenses, and as a broader icon for openness and collaboration.1 FOSS has
attained a robust socio-political life as a touchstone for like-minded projects in
art, law, journalism, and science—some examples being MIT’s OpenCourseWare
project, School Forge, and the BBC’s decision to release all their archives under a
Creative Commons license. One might suspect FOSS of having a deliberate polit-
ical agenda, but when asked, FOSS developers invariably offer a firm and unam-
biguous “no”—usually followed by a precise lexicon for discussing the proper
relationship between FOSS and politics. For example, while it is perfectly accept-
able and encouraged to have a panel on free software at an anti-globalization
conference, FOSS developers would suggest that it is unacceptable to claim that
FOSS has as one of its goals anti-globalization, or for that matter any political pro-
gram—a subtle but vital difference, which captures the uncanny, visceral, and
minute semiotic acts by which developers divorce FOSS from a guided political
direction. FOSS, of course, beholds a complex political life despite the lack of
political intention; nonetheless, I argue that the political agnosticism of FOSS
shapes the expressive life and force of its informal politics. 
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FOSS gives palpable voice to the growing fault lines between expressive and
intellectual property rights, especially in the context of digital technologies.
While free speech and property rights are often imagined as linked and essen-
tial parts of our American liberal heritage, the social life of FOSS complicates
this connection while providing a window into how liberal values such as free
speech take on specific forms through cultural-based technical practice: that
of computer hacking.2 Whereas, traditionally, censorship and state interven-
tion were seen as the primary threats against the realization of free speech,
the social practices of free and open software raise the idea that forms prop-
erty can be antithetical to the principles of free speech, “principles” that are
constantly under social revision though they might appear as timeless and
obvious. Source code, the blueprint for programs that most non-technical
users rarely see, is becoming an object to construct claims about vocational
rights and the appropriate scope of First Amendment law;3 FOSS has not only
transformed the dynamics of software development but is also shifting under-
standings of the appropriate use of intellectual property instruments and the
scope of free speech protections. 
I argue that the wedge placed by practitioners between FOSS and politics is
significant to an anthropological assessment of the liberal underpinnings and
reformulations of FOSS and the wider socio-political effect of its vast circula-
tions. My thesis is that the denial of FOSS’ formal politics enacted through a
particularized cultural exercise of free speech facilitates the broad mobility of
FOSS as artifacts and metaphors and thus lays the groundwork for its informal
political scope: its key role as a catalyst by which to rethink the assumptions
of intellectual property rights through its use and inversion. It works because
it recalibrates some of the distinctions and associations between free speech
and intellectual property—it revises intellectual property law and channels it
toward the protection of free speech, instead of its “conventional use” of
securing property rights. Christopher Kelty aptly describes this as “openness
through privatization, which makes it the most powerful political movement
on the Internet, even though most of its proponents spend all their extra
energy denying that it is political” (2000:6).
Political intent and subjectivity are indeed noticeably absent in the consti-
tution of the free software and open source movement, which differs from
more formal political endeavors and new social movements predicated on
some political intentionality, direction, or reflexivity or a desire to transform
wider social conditions. FOSS uniqueness as a “new social movement” stands
precisely in the “extra energy” noted by Kelty to deny political associations of
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various kinds.4 While technical or economic rationalities are often the native
explanation for FOSS, a taken for granted form of cultural liberalism and the
pragmatics of programming mutually inform and reinforce the hacker aes-
thetic distaste for politics. In other words, political denial is culturally orches-
trated through a rearticulation of free speech principles, a cultural position-
ing that simultaneously is informed by the computing techniques and
outwardly expresses and thus constitutes hacker values. It is this practice that
I refer to here as “political agnosticism.”
The purported political neutrality of FOSS, inscribed into its technological
artifacts through licenses, has facilitated an unfettered circulation of its tech-
nologies. FOSS is made visible to wider publics through its extensive use and
resignification. The witnessable set of practices, such as collaborative produc-
tion and the creative deployment of licenses, has become a social point of
contrast by which the assumptions of the American legal intellectual proper-
ty system are partially destabilized. It thus conveys an implicit critique of the
opaque logics enveloped in the neoliberal drive to make property out of
everything and, at this historical conjunction, seemingly out of very little.5
As noted by Herman and Coombe in this journal, the persuasive force of
neoliberal rhetorics of property rights lie in their corporeality as an habituat-
ed ethos that defines the proper, veritable, and, thus, supposedly singular
relationship between consumers, objects, and corporations. Though they
astutely assert that intellectual property regimes are bent toward the “incor-
rigible” and are “resistant to revision,” FOSS has inadvertently performed with
some degree of success against this habituated stance. FOSS provides another
existing and transposable model for new legal possibilities composed of an
aggregate of practices, licenses, social relationships, artifacts, and moral
economies and, thus, enters a wider public debate on the limits of intellectu-
al property primarily though visible cultural praxis. Its “success” is that it
transformed what is purported to be a “singular” field of intellectual proper-
ty law into one that is now multiple, offering new instruments and justifica-
tions for their use.6
Political Agnosticism 
To understand the logic of political denial, it is instructive to define the ration-
ale for freedom formulated in the philosophical underpinnings of FOSS licens-
es. The moral and semiotic load of free software is a commitment to prevent
limiting the freedom of others. This is done to realize a sphere for the unfet-
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tered circulation of thought, expression, and action for software develop-
ment. This vision is clear in three key documents that guide the choice and
creation of every free and open source license: the Free Software Definition,
the Debian Free Software Guidelines, and the Open Source Definition. In these
charters, freedom underscores an individual’s right to create, use, and distrib-
ute software in a manner that will allow exactly the same for others, so long
as license rules are followed—the goal of which is to enact a universal sphere
for the flourishing of free forms of action and thought. All provisions in these
documents work through a logic of non-discrimination as to achieve univer-
sality. Within this purview, source code, the line-by-line directions that pro-
grammers write to make software applications, is treated implicitly and
explicitly as a form of speech. Writing source code is thus akin to “speaking”
while licenses establish the conditions that allow for the free and unrestricted
expression of speech.
A utilitarian ethic of openness is increasingly seen as obvious and indispensa-
ble in order to develop the “state of the art.” FOSS developers also place an
extremely high premium on open technical production as an avenue for expres-
sive activity. While hackers see the spread of free software as socially beneficial
because it allows a diverse range of “others” to deploy their software (like you,
me, the Mexican school system, the government, and even “Big Brother”), the
primary significance of FOSS is personal: it is something which protects the
“food” for them to “hack on” so that they can exercise their right to learn from
and create more speech (source code) for others to share and extend. According
to hackers, the fact that anyone can use FOSS and that it can be directed towards
economic, political, and personal ends is a positive side-effect of openness; they
consider it a testament to the power of a neutral political commitment. 
The “free” of free software rests on yet reposes a wider Anglo-European
socio-cultural sensibility for expressive rights, which underscores ideas of indi-
vidual autonomy, self-development, and a value-free marketplace for the
expression of ideas. As a number of critical scholars argue, forms of political
neutrality are immanent to free speech doctrine (Brown 1995, Fish 1999,
Marcuse 1965, MacKinnon 1993, Passavat 2002). These critiques treat decon-
textualized neutrality primarily as ideological scaffolding that justifies a poli-
tics of individual liberties over those of structural equality. While relevant in
other ways, it is analytically deficient to analyze the free speech elements of
free software as an example of these otherwise cogent analyses—that is, as an
augmentation or verification of an already existing and mystified American
liberal tradition.
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The hacker aesthetic distaste for politics and their free speech codes can
only be meaningfully ascertained as “cultural practice” if placed within the
scope of their lived practical and material actions, not just in relation to how
their values express or map perfectly onto some existing regime of value such
as liberalism; If not, we construe their moral orders as vacuous and thus,
decouple their values from a particular way of life and the historical condi-
tions that enable and constrain what they do.7 Also to simply assert that the
free speech character of FOSS is an expression of liberal values occludes key
questions of investigation, for example: why is a language of expressive rights
compelling to programmers, and how does the local rearticulation of expres-
sive rights shift the wider juridical and cultural face and expressions of liber-
al values? Continuity of liberal traditions does not mean sameness. In other
words, it reminds us that free speech, privacy, and property right have com-
plex histories born from material and discursive struggles over meaning, even
if such principles are socially construed as beyond the turmoil of history.8
The freedom of free software, while influenced by wider liberal sensibilities,
is fundamentally shaped by the pragmatics of programming and the social
context of Internet use. My contention is that values for expressive rights as for-
mulated in free software philosophy were and are compelling to programmers
because they hold affinities with their technical habitus borne from “practical”
(as in meaningful, embodied, and collective action) experiences formed
around the pragmatics of programming and the aesthetics of technical archi-
tectures. In addition, in recent times, it has afforded a wider cultural and polit-
ical language by which to objectify to themselves and larger publics the nature
of their technical life world, an objectification buttressed within a hacker pub-
lic sphere and as a political vector to make claims against the aggressive appli-
cation of intellectual property restrictions.9
Programmers describe their craft as an activity that allows for personal unre-
stricted forms of creativity, expression, learning, and action, enacted through a
medium, the digital computer, and preferably interfaced through a transparent
and flexible, technical environment (like UNIX). Passion that is understood to be
the basis of the hacker ethic (Himanen 2001, Levy 1984) is fueled by a practice
that allows programmers great flexibility and control in creation (Turkle 1984),
creations which are put to use and hence seen as highly valuable. Programmers
over decades of intense interaction come to viscerally experience the computer
as a general purpose machine that can be infinitely programmed to achieve any
task through the medium of software written by humans with a computer lan-
guage. The technological potential for unlimited programmable capabilities
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melds with what is seen as the expansive ability for programmers to create. For
programmers, computing in a dual sense, as a technology and as an activity,
becomes a total realm for the freedom of creation and expression. In essence,
computing is understood and experienced (sometimes reflectively, other times
implicitly) by FOSS hackers as the very micro-sphere for the unfettered circula-
tion of thought, expression, and action that freedom within the macro-sphere
FOSS seeks to achieve through licenses. 
Downloading music and watching movies, socializing in chat rooms, play-
ing highly addictive mutli-player games, creating software libre, meeting
future girlfriends and wives on chat channels, reading your news daily
online—all these activities contribute to a strong practical orientation and
embodied disposition that the activity of communicating on and creating
through a computer is a space of freedom for entertainment, production,
pedagogy, and sociality. 
More than ever, hackers actively and self-reflexively constitute these values
within a type of public sphere where hackers discuss the corporate and legal
practices that are seen to impinge on their ability to engage in such forms of
“free” expressive making (Coleman and Hill 2004). The indiscriminate applica-
tion of patents to software algorithms and other encryption and copyright laws,
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), are construed as threats to
the free ability of programmers to write source code, which hackers and pro-
grammers have only recently come to conceptualize as a form of communica-
tion worthy of the broadest protections afforded by First Amendment law.
Despite this incipient cognizance of the legal threats to free speech, what
grows out of this particular life world of intense, lifelong programming and
networked sociality is an overt aesthetic dislike for politics and a culturally
embodied experience of freedom that conceptually shuns politics. Put simply,
political claims outside of software subtract from, tarnish, and censor the
sphere for the free circulation of thought, action, and expression. It is felt that
if FOSS was directed towards a political end, it would sully the “purity” of the
technical decision-making process. Political affiliation also might deter people
from participating on development, thus creating an artificial barrier to entry
into this sphere whose ideal and idealized form is a transparent meritocracy.10
A political tag is also perceived to curtail one’s personal freedom for deciding
how to best interpret this domain of activity—a form of censorship and thus
a highly polluted association to conjure. 
In addition, the pragmatics of computing is a means by which to typify
political activity as distasteful, unappealing, and ineffective. While program-
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ming is considered a transparent, neutral, highly controllable realm for
thought and expression where production results in immediate gratification
and something useful, politics tend to be seen by programmers as buggy,
mediated, and tainted action clouded by ideology that is not productive of
much of anything while it insidiously works against true forms of free
thought. You can’t tweak politics in an elegant and creative way to achieve
something immediately gratifying, and thus it goes against everything pro-
grammers think and love about computing.
The Inadvertent Politics of Contrast
I now shift my discussion to assess the political implications of FOSS. The mul-
tiple uses of FOSS and its transposability and visibility are simultaneously con-
ditions for what I call a cultural critique through contrast. To explain what I
mean let’s visit our own field for a moment. Anthropology has historically
unsettled our essentialist and universal assumptions about human behavior
by contrasting them with those of people from other places (cf. Benedict 1959,
Mead 1928, Marcus and Fisher 1986, Mauss 1967, Sahlins 1976). The discipli-
nary vehicle for this, it has been noted eloquently, is ethnography which
“serves at once to make the familiar strange and the strange familiar”
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:6). FOSS, among many other things, functions
as a form of critical ethnography writ large. While a critical anthropology is
based on a consciousness of its politics, FOSS inadvertently has become a vehi-
cle by which to rethink the naturalness of intellectual property law. It exem-
plifies what Marcus and Fisher call “defamiliarization by cross cultural juxta-
position” (1986), the difference being that juxtaposition arises out of an
accidental cultural and not intentional anthropological practice. Its ability to
conjure contrast, I argue, results from its marked visibility and transportabili-
ty partially borne from its purported political neutrality.
Free and open source hackers have been effective in coding FOSS as politi-
cally removed—a “neutrality” made material and socially effective through
licenses. The effect is that the freedom within FOSS exudes a similar productive
ambiguity that Prakash (1999) locates in the sign of science in his study of
Indian nationalists who directed the icon of sciences as “the sign of rationality
and progress” towards justifying their anti-colonial liberation aspirations. Due
to this productive ambiguity that resists political affiliation of left, right, and
liberal, FOSS has circulated extensively, though the relevance of freedom and
openness mutates along the way of its excursions, fueling economic, govern-
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mental, popular, and leftist articulations as justifications and alternatives. For
example, I.B.M and other business that use FOSS emphasize it for its “market
agility” and its ability to empower the consumer. I.B.M. adopts a neoliberal lan-
guage to interpret the significance of FOSS to its consumer publics. On the
opposite side of the spectrum, leftist media websites such as Indymedia.net
run almost entirely on FOSS while its activists adore it for its subversive, anti-
capitalist potentialities. The commons movement, centered on the idea of cre-
ating public goods to reinvigorate democratic principles, pragmatically built
their licenses and justifications around the already existing practice of FOSS
(Bollier 2002, Lessig 2001). Each group situates it in ways that empowers and
legitimates their own aspirations, but through their particular efforts they
extend FOSS to wider publics. And though there are distinct imaginaries graft-
ed onto FOSS, certain implicit political messages within the labor and law of
free and open source software also gain visible prominence.
Through its visibility and use by multiple publics, FOSS makes apparent, and
to some extent “strange,” the assumptions that dominate the social landscape
of intellectual property. It opens to critical scrutiny the liberal moral “habitua-
tions” that stringent intellectual property instruments are indispensable to fos-
ter innovation and creation. Thousands upon thousands of developers laboring
to make software libre provides potent critiques and viable alternatives since it
is realized by the social performance of collective labor and licenses that others
can and now do use. Perhaps most significant is that FOSS enjoins others to
become part of its performance in various ways: use of FOSS artifacts and licens-
es, participation in projects, reflection of the larger meaning of collaboration,
and the reuse (and reconfigurations) of its licenses for other non-technological
objects, such as college courseware, music, books, and movies.
Actualized labor in practice undermines current theories of labor in the
law whose nature is to pose singular models for the proper relationship
between legal means and ends. Licenses like the copyleft rupture the natural-
ized “form” of intellectual property by inverting its ossified and singular
logic—through the very use of intellectual property—a move not unlike
Marx’s inversion of Hegelian idealism, which retained Hegel’s dialectical
method to repose history not as an expression of the “Absolute Idea” but as
humanity’s collective creation through labor. Using copyright as its vehicle,
the copyleft places copyright literally on its head and in the process demysti-
fies copyright’s “absolute” theory of economic incentive. The copyleft says, we
are not the passive “subjects” of an almighty, unchangeable law, but actually
can create the law to serve us for other ends: in the case of FOSS, that of free
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speech. While many hackers might think you can’t tweak politics in an elegant
and creative way to achieve something immediate and useful, Richard
Stallman, the mastermind behind the copyleft, showed through a clever legal
hack that politics can be gratifying and indeed very productive. 
Conclusion
Over the course of the last thirty years, anthropologists have increasingly left
for the field by staying home. Research in medical clinics, scientific laborato-
ries, online communities, city neighborhoods, and high schools, to name a
few such locations, has shifted the meaning of anthropological practice, the
implications of theoretical critique, and the identity of the ethnographer
(Marcus 1999). The nature of this research makes more clear that normative
and ubiquitous regimes of values, such as those posed by liberalism, science,
and capitalism, have a much more variegated expression when located in par-
ticular institutions, social groups, or an assemblage between them. In other
words, the local is as much here as it is “there” in foreign or small scale soci-
eties, and part of the task of a critical anthropology is to conjoin the exercise
of anthropological critique with the cultural processes of “defamiliarization”
and critique located in historical practice, not in theory. 
The source and the effect of political agnosticism has been the focus of this
piece. FOSS, I have argued, is one local instantiation of liberal values, a
rearticulation centered on reposing the relationship between intellectual
property and free speech law by redirecting the use of licenses to protect
expressive activity. FOSS sensibilities of freedom and the growing hacker asser-
tion that source code is speech, largely regimented as politically neutral
through liberal values, are also rooted in methodologies, values, and tech-
niques constituted around the act of writing code and expressed visibly in a
wider public social sphere of hacking. Through FOSS’ visibility, circulation, and
use, the juridical understanding of free speech is shifting while some of the
ingrained assumptions of intellectual property law have already been partial-
ly destabilized, the wider effect of which has been to open up a social space
for new legal possibilities. 
The feature of critique that arises through the cultural struggle to recreate
and redefine meanings and associations, I have come to learn, is much more
ephemeral than the supposed ephemera of virtual social spaces. It is a
moment in time whose nature is to shock other “socially situated actors” into
a process of cultural rethinking that shifts practices in other areas of social
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life. The nature of the shock is to lose its “shock value” so to speak and sink
back into the natural state of affairs as soon as a set of practices are more or
less stabilized. The journalistic, popular, and native narrative retelling of the
rise and importance of new practices or political sensibilities often don’t inte-
grate this moment of cultural defamiliarization, focusing instead on the
rubric of great men and their ideas or explanation through unintended con-
sequences that may not have been part of its genesis. Thus, the task of a crit-
ical anthropology within complex multi-cultural societies is to keep a mindful
orientation toward these powerful yet elusive processes of cultural contrast
and defamiliarization so that its politics can be more effectively known,
acknowledged, and directed.
ENDNOTES
1This is a short piece with many large ideas. Most of them have congealed through conver-
sations with friends and colleagues. I would like to thank dmh, ck, rex, hacim, and mako
for their comments and suggestions. A special thanks to Patrice Riemens whose works and
insights are largely responsible for getting me to think differently about the unique nature
of hacker politics.
2For an explicit defense and affirmation of the inseparability between strong property rights
and civil liberties see Gray (1996) in his review of liberal political thought and more recent-
ly in Epstein (2003). However, legal scholars since at least the 1970s have perceptively ana-
lyzed the ways in which IP and expressive rights exist in tension with each other (cf Nimmer
1970, Benkler 1999). Copyright law limits access to and use of certain forms of “expressive
content” and thus inherently curbs the deployment of copyrighted material in other expres-
sive activity. However, the predominant legal rationale for the state sanction of intellectual
property instruments is that they are mechanisms by which to “harvest” a marketplace of
ideas so that any negative consequences of censoring speech are far outweighed by this pur-
ported public benefit. FOSS fundamentally challenges the rationale that censorship is a jus-
tifiable means to induce a marketplace of idea.
3It is important to appreciate that the links made between source code and free speech are
historically recent. To my knowledge, it first appeared as a published argument in a paper
among programmers in the early 1990s (Salin 1991). It increasingly became a prevalent
association in the writings of Richard Stallman, the founder of Free Software Foundation.
The “encryption wars”—the right to freely publish and use cryptography—also contributed
to this consciousness. A notable case in these struggles was Bernstein vs. the Department of
Justice, first filed in 1995. The Berkeley Professor Daniel Bernstein successfully argued that
he had a First Amendment right to publish strong forms of encryption despite government
restrictions that treat strong cryptography as munitions. While these legal contexts were cru-
cial, neither Salin or Bernstein questioned the validity of copyright law as a barrier to
speech. What free software added to the story of expressive rights among programmers was
a more fundamental challenge to the idea of property for software. 
4As many studies reveal, politics far exceeds activities formally designated as such. Healing
rituals that integrate and reconfigure dominant signs (Comaroff 1985), dance (Martin 1998),
popular festivals and literary genres (Bakhtin 1984), and everyday forms of workplace resist-
ance such as foot dragging and ritualized fainting (Ong 1987; Scott 1985) are a small sam-
pling of the wide array of phenomena treated as fundamentally political even though they
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are not cast in those terms. My argument about the political agnosticism of FOSS draws from
the starting point of these (and many other) works: that politics has a life beyond that of
the obvious and directed. However, while many of the highlighted examples of “politics
without intent” carry a politics, many of these forms are not premised on the very value and
idea that these forms are not political, which I find analytically significant for this particu-
lar case. 
5Currents in intellectual property law over the last thirty years are marked by the expansion
of rights commandeered by intellectual property owners matched by the opening of new
markets and materials for the scope of private property. Shifts in intellectual property appli-
cation have been explored in relation to the academy and scientific production (see
Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Mirowski and Sent 2002); its impact on cultural life, democracy,
and innovation (see Betting 1996; Boyle 1996; Coombe 1998; Lessig 1999, 2001); and as a
reconsideration of approaches of the relevance of IP for indigenous knowledge (see Graves
1994, Brush and Stabinsky 1995, and Shiva 1997).
6I am not claiming that traditional intellectual property rights have now lost any of their
force to structure objects, property relations, and the organization of science. I also am not
in the “business” of making predictions about the ways in which the rise of a novel appli-
cation of intellectual property laws such as those of FOSS will dilute or strengthen current
neoliberal property rights regimes. However, it is vital to point out that until FOSS, the
American and European state of intellectual property law was largely a singular sphere of
rights with little room to think outside their assumptive boxes. 
7In other words, I want to conjoin the study of liberalism to wider socio-cultural processes.
For two pieces that examine the cultural life and force of liberalism through the angle of
governmentality see Joyce (2003) and Rose (1999). Both inform my understandings of liber-
alism as a mode of thought that is socially lived through practice, can be treated as a cul-
tural and spatial force, and is productive of unique subject positions. Their emphasis on
materiality, informed by the work of Latour, helps to situate broad values as significant to
wider cultural processes. However, I depart from their framework as they offer a view in
which the effect of liberal values take on widespread, uniform instantiations whereas my
research interest is to show the more particularized expression of such values through cul-
tural activity and the wider effect of such. 
8See the collection in Bollinger and Stone (2002) for an examination of the complex juridi-
cal and socio-historical history of free speech doctrine in the American context.
9Here I refer to the mobilizations enacted by hackers between 1999-2003 to protest the
DMCA and the arrest of two programmers, Jon Johansen and Dmitry Sklyarov. In my disser-
tation, I argue that these protests had the effect of stabilizing the association between free
speech and source code that had been under cultivation for at least a decade as a social
ethos within the context of the free and open source software movement. I would like to
note that though I argue FOSS practitioners place a wedge between FOSS and politics and
tend to dislike politics on an aesthetic level, this does not mean, of course, that they are cul-
turally hardwired to avoid politics. However, the exceptional nature of these mobilizations
confirm what I argue here: FOSS and their right to program should not be directed toward
political ends. FOSS, and other forms of computing, should primarily be about the exercise
of individual expressive activity protected under the dual rubric of academic freedom and
free speech.
10A discourse of radical openness and accessibility, posited against the idea of politics, is
often expressed by FOSS hackers and, I would say, enacted to some degree in the structure
of many projects that try to stay away from the culture of bureaucratic monotony and frus-
trating “red tape” common to government agencies and some corporations. Of course, there
are certainly informal and structural barriers for entry whether it is class, gender, or depth
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of technical knowledge. FOSS hackers often mistakenly conclude that explicit forms of
exclusiveness and discrimination are the only barriers to participation.
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